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15 January 1953

COMMENTS ON ONE DRAFT PAPER NIE-45 ON YUGOSLAVIA:

1. The statement in this paragraph contains two distinct situations which should be clearly divorced. A situation including a build-up of Satellite capabilities should not be treated in the same frame as "an apparent decline in Satellite aggressiveness;" for to Belgrade there is only an academic distinction between apparent intentions and capabilities insofar as the orbit is concerned.

2. Here it might be well to clearly define what is meant by the term "West." If NATO is synonomous with the term, the statement is not entirely accurate. Yugoslav rapprochement and desire for a mutual defense pact with Greece and Turkey ~~(would~~ constitutes ~~be)~~ one glaring exception to this generalization.

With respect to the motives underlying Belgrade's anti-Church manifestations, it is unlikely that the principal reason for the Vatican break was an attempt to offend Western public opinion for the sake of asserting its independence. Since the break it has become apparent that the action was largely a reaction to Vatican intransigence and a specific act designed to reduce the power of the Church over its hierarchy in Yugoslavia.

3. The assumption underlying the statement that Yugoslavia will seek to use cooperation with Greece and Turkey as a "device to isolate Italy and put pressure on Italy, and also will seek to establish its own primacy over Greece as a Balkan power," is questionable. For one thing, the term "to isolate Italy" needs clarification. For example, it is doubtful that Yugoslavia entertains the misconception that it can isolate Italy from France, or its other European allies. On the other hand, exclusion of Italy from a Balkan alliance, or at the very least, the restriction of Italian influence in Greece and Albania is a realistic program.

4. There are no indications of Yugoslav efforts to encourage Titoism in China through dealings with China. Also, the concept of Yugoslavia increasing its efforts to build-up a "third force" group of small nations conflicts with the general evaluation made in paragraph 1 to the effect that Yugoslavia will increase its Western orientation as the power of Satellite armies increase. Yugoslavia's efforts to support a "third force" will probably be matched or exceeded by its attempts to establish closer working relationships with various left-wing groups in Europe and Asia.

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2. Yugoslavia & Finland:

a. Yugoslavia: Y+F ONI

(1) Para 2. The Yugoslavs do not necessarily desire to "offend" the West, but they will certainly "disregard" Western opinion in certain matters.

(2) Para 4, line 10. We feel the idea of completely "independent" voice in East-West struggle is too strong. Suggest it be modified by addition of, "but anti-Soviet".

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